| dc.contributor.advisor | Rice, Louisa | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Ducksworth-Lawton, Selika M. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Henriksen, Christoffer J. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-29T19:28:02Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-07-29T19:28:02Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-05-18 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/72865 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Looking at the debriefing transcripts from double-agent Col. Oleg Penkovsky reveals a wealth of information. This information proved useful in two Cold War crises: the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis. While technology provides insight into what one's opponents are doing, it lacks the distinctly human factor necessary for a full assessment of a given situation. Looking at the case of Oleg Penkovsky, we see what might drive one to defect, the importance of human intelligence, and its effects on Cold War crises. | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | USGZE AS333 | en |
| dc.subject | Cold War | en |
| dc.subject | Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 | en |
| dc.title | "I Was": The Oleg Penkovsky Story and the Important of Human Intelligence in Cold War Crises | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
