

**Raising the Bar:
Refocused Indicators
for U.S. Government Assistance
to Pakistan**

Prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies

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Foreword

Students in the Master of International Public Affairs (MIPA) program in the Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin–Madison produced this report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, represented for this project by Farha Tahir, Program Coordinator and Research Associate, Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation. The students are enrolled in the Workshop in International Public Affairs, the capstone course in their graduate program. The workshop provides MIPA students the opportunity to improve their analytical skills by applying them to an issue with a substantial international component and to contribute useful knowledge and recommendations to their client.

The La Follette School offers a two-year graduate program leading to a Master of Public Affairs or a Master of International Public Affairs degree. In both programs, students develop analytic tools with which to assess policy responses to issues, evaluate implications of policies for efficiency and equity, and interpret and present data relevant to policy considerations.

The workshop provides practical experience applying the tools of analysis acquired during three semesters of prior coursework to actual problems clients face in the public, non-governmental, and private sectors. Students work in teams to produce carefully crafted policy reports that meet high professional standards. The reports are research-based, analytical, evaluative, and (where relevant) prescriptive responses to real-world clients. This culminating experience is the ideal equivalent of the thesis for the La Follette School degrees in public affairs. While the acquisition of a set of analytical skills is important, it is no substitute for learning by doing.

The opinions and judgments presented in the report do not represent the views, official or unofficial, of the La Follette School or of the client for which the report was prepared.

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Executive Summary

A 2007 study commissioned by the Center for Strategic and International Studies examined U.S. government assistance to Pakistan and offered a series of recommendations to improve aid delivery. The United States' 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act reflected these recommendations: instead of focusing solely on security-related aid, the U.S. government now incorporates substantial amounts of civilian assistance into its aid strategy to eliminate the immediate extremist threat in Pakistan and pave the way to long-term peace through development.

As promising as this new approach is, the administration of a whole-of-nation approach to aid is problematic without appropriate indicators to measure progress. This report examines the U.S. government's goals in Pakistan and proposes a set of 23 clear, focused indicators to assess progress toward goals in the security and civilian sectors. Although challenges are inherent in this type of performance measurement, these indicators nevertheless represent a concrete foundation with which to gauge the effectiveness of the new approach. The U.S. government has a remarkable opportunity to contribute long-term stability to a country that has longed lacked it; it must ensure that its aid does not go to waste.

Introduction

A 2007 study commissioned by the Center for Strategic and International Studies examined U.S. government assistance to Pakistan and offered a series of recommendations to improve aid delivery. The overarching theme of these recommendations was expanding the focus of aid programs from primarily security-related assistance to include a greater emphasis on economic, governance, and social development. In support of the primary goal of diminishing extremist threats, the author of the CSIS report argued that U.S. government aid should also be designed to improve the living conditions of the people of Pakistan through sustainable economic development, strong democracy, and the enhanced rule of law.¹ The 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) reflected this concept, and the U.S. government began implementation of a new, whole-of-nation approach.²

It will be several years before the effect of the reforms initiated by the EPPA can be fully accounted for. What must be accomplished in the interim is to ensure that adequate metrics are in place to properly assess this new strategy toward Pakistan. Our report examines measures of effectiveness already proposed under the broad categories of aid and considers alternative evidence-based indicators that might allow for more accurate evaluation. We first determine 10 key goals of U.S. government assistance to Pakistan and then propose 23 quantifiable indicators to measure progress toward those goals. Based upon this analysis, we establish a set of clear, focused indicators to measure the effectiveness of the new aid strategy.

The Relationship between the United States and Pakistan

The last decade of the 20th century was marked by extremely limited interactions between the United States and Pakistan. Although the U.S. government used Pakistan and its intelligence services as a conduit for arms and money during the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s, the conclusion of that conflict and the fall of the Soviet Union led to declining U.S. interest in the region as a whole. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan was severed completely in the 1990s when Pakistan embarked upon a nuclear weapons program as part of its ongoing dispute with India. During the next decade, the divergence between the U.S. government and Pakistan became more apparent with the devolution of democracy in Pakistan, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate support for the burgeoning Taliban in Afghanistan, and Pakistan's conflict with India.³

The al Qaeda terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, precipitated a shift in U.S.-Pakistan relations. With the Taliban and al Qaeda right next door, Pakistan was no longer an unstable, autocratic, quasi-Islamist backwater with dangerous aspirations of nuclear armament—it was one of the United States' foremost allies against Islamic extremism. After Pakistan swiftly condemned the actions of the Islamic fundamentalist groups, it entered into agreements with the U.S. government to

provide logistical and intelligence support, as well as access to Pakistani bases for anti-terror operations; it also conducted offensives against extremists within its own borders. In return, the Bush administration lifted sanctions and forgave large amounts of Pakistani debt. Additionally, it provided the Pakistani government with ongoing security, development, and economic assistance.⁴

The security situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorated significantly in 2008, and the U.S. government embarked on a series of policy reviews and strategy adjustments in hopes of bolstering its allies. There were growing concerns over the increased capabilities of al Qaeda and Taliban cells, primarily in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Northwest Frontier Province (now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) that border Afghanistan, to mount attacks in the region and against the American mainland. These developments, coupled with a series of devastating earthquakes and overall dire poverty that further destabilized Pakistan, prompted President Obama to sign the EPPA into law on October 15, 2009.⁵

This legislation, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, was designed as “a balanced, integrated, countrywide strategy for Pakistan that provides assistance throughout the country and does not disproportionately focus on security-related assistance or one particular area or province.”⁶ It tripled the amount of U.S. government assistance to Pakistan and emphasized non-military assistance as well as security aid, with the requirement that democratic institutions be reinforced.⁷ Congress determined that a successful strategy to combat terrorism would focus on three broad categories of civilian aid: (1) high-impact, high-visibility infrastructure programs (in the energy and agriculture sectors), (2) focused humanitarian and social services, and (3) government capacity development.⁸ By including these three new pillars of assistance, the U.S. government aimed to provide economic, social, and political development as well as security assistance, thereby taking a more comprehensive approach that would transform Pakistan into a stronger partner.

The Strategic Goal of U.S. Aid to Pakistan

The primary objective of U.S. government aid to Pakistan is the eradication of violent extremist groups in the short-term and the prevention of their reorganization in the long run.⁹ The short-term goals aim to prevent extremist groups from launching attacks while the long-term goals are focused on overall social and economic development.

Violent extremist groups flourish in environments where there is instability, conflict, weak governance, and ineffective democracy. Pakistan suffers from all of those, mainly because of a “culture of impunity and injustice, discontent in the provinces, ethnic and sectarian tensions, a rapidly growing and urbanizing youth population, and extremist views among traditional in-country allies.”¹⁰ Extremist

groups exploit those conditions “to recruit followers on the basis of a narrative of shared suffering and injustice and of the state’s failure to provide stability or prosperity.”¹¹ The short-term goals of disruption and the long-term goals of development address these issues in hopes that stability will bring peace.

The elimination of violent insurgent elements in Pakistan necessitates breaking up the networks of extremist groups and degrading their ability to launch attacks.¹² This course of action requires military assistance, primarily in the form of strengthening the Pakistani military by providing expertise, equipment, and training. The short-term goals require prudent investment in security-related aid. This type of assistance far outweighed the share of non-military aid from 2002 to 2008, a reflection of the U.S. government’s short-sightedness during that time. The tripling of non-military aid by the EPPA signaled a shift toward a more balanced, long-term approach to U.S. government goals.¹³

The prevention of extremist groups from reorganizing requires the overall development of Pakistan, socially and economically. Scholarly literature indicates that extremist groups recruit from a mass of impoverished people; therefore, the fight against radicalism is effective only if social and economic development is set as a long-term objective.¹⁴ Accordingly, the U.S. government stresses that, “To assist Pakistan in a time of strife, U.S. assistance will help the Government of Pakistan improve services to poor and vulnerable communities, reducing the space for extremist groups to gain popular support by doing so instead.”¹⁵


Social development includes the enhancement of democracy by handing over the reins of government to civilians and establishing the rule of law, and is often referred to as political or institutional development. Although Pakistan now has a civilian government, the country has been ruled by a succession of military dictators for about half of its existence. Therefore, Pakistan has a long way to go in developing its democratic governance institutions. Economic development entails an increase in opportunities for the people of Pakistan so that they can attain good health, education, and other basic necessities of life. The long-term goals are therefore related to the overall prosperity and development of Pakistani people and require aid that is tailored to civilian as well as military needs. Appendix A contains further discussion of the nexus between development and terrorism prevention.

Overview of Current Aid to Pakistan

A brief overview of the primary categories of U.S. government assistance to Pakistan provides a framework upon which to base our analysis. As we noted, aid now can be divided into two main areas: security-related and civilian. Civilian aid can be separated further into political and economic as well as social services subcategories. The following section broadly outlines U.S. government aid initiatives.

Figure 1 illustrates the changing dynamics of U.S. assistance to Pakistan since 2002. As shown, all aid rapidly increased following the enactment of the EPPA, but civilian aid as a whole experienced a larger increase than did security aid. The spike in social services aid (including disaster assistance) in 2010 stems from the U.S. government’s contribution to emergency relief and recovery efforts following the large-scale flooding in Pakistan in August and September 2010.¹⁶

Figure 1: U.S. Government Aid to Pakistan 2002-2010



Source: Authors using data from Kronstadt¹⁷ and USAID¹⁸

Security-Related Aid

From fiscal year (FY) 2002 through FY2008, the U.S. government provided \$2.2 billion in security-related assistance to Pakistan; for the two-year period from FY2009 to FY2010, that figure was also \$2.2 billion.¹⁹ Table 1 details the major programs of this type of aid. Further information may be found in Appendix B.

Table 1: Security-Related Aid

Program	U.S. Department	Description
Coalition Support Funds	Defense	Reimburses expenditures by the Pakistani military in counter-terror operations ²⁰
National Defense Authorization Act Section 1206 Programs	Defense	Funds training and equipment of Pakistani military in support of counter-terror operations
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	State	Funds counterdrug efforts, with a primary focus on border security
Counternarcotics Fund	Defense and State	Funds internal counterdrug operations
Foreign Military Financing	Defense and State	Provides grants to the Pakistani military to purchase U.S. equipment, services and training
International Military Education and Training	State (budget) Defense (training)	Pays for professional education and military management and technical training on U.S. weapons systems
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related	State	Safeguards nuclear material and enhances anti-terror capabilities
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund	DOD, now State	Trains and equips Pakistan's army/security forces, with particular emphasis placed on combat in Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Source: Authors using information from Kronstadt²¹

Civilian Aid

We consider civilian aid in two subcategories, political and economic aid, and social services aid. The amount and scope of civilian aid provided to Pakistan has changed dramatically. From FY2002 to FY2008, roughly \$3.23 billion was classified as non-security-related assistance.²² Another \$3.82 billion was allocated to civilian aid in FY2009 and FY2010.²³

With the EPPA’s passage in 2009, Congress authorized \$1.5 billion annually from FY2010 through FY2014 for democratic, economic, and social services appropriations in Pakistan.²⁴ Of the total \$7.5 billion authorized during this period, the Obama administration plans to devote \$3.5 billion to high-impact, high-visibility infrastructure programming and \$2 billion to develop Pakistani government capacity through improvements in national and local governance, and security and legal institutions.²⁵ The remaining \$2 billion is committed to health, education, and humanitarian programs as social services aid.²⁶

Political and Economic Aid

From FY2002 to FY2008, approximately \$2.7 billion was classified as non-emergency development and economic aid.²⁷ Funds allocated to this type of assistance in FY2009 and FY2010 totaled \$1.7 billion.²⁸ Table 2 details the major program categories of this type of aid. Further information may be found in Appendix C.

Table 2: Political and Economic Aid

Program Category	U.S. Agencies	Description
Government Capacity Development	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), State Department, with subcontractors	Strengthens Pakistani governance institutions, with emphasis on legislative bodies
High-Impact, High-Visibility Infrastructure Development	USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Treasury, with subcontractors	Primarily targets energy and agriculture sectors

Source: Authors using information from USAID, State, and DOD²⁹

Social Services Aid

From FY2002 to FY2008, roughly \$500 million was classified as social services aid.³⁰ Approximately \$2.1 billion was allocated to that category while in FY2009 and FY2010, but the figure includes humanitarian assistance³¹ given in the wake of severe floods. This emergency humanitarian relief took precedence over many planned programs, and ongoing recovery needs likely will affect long-term progress. While humanitarian and flood response assistance constitute major portions of social services aid, our report focuses on non-crisis development due to its long-term impact.

Table 3 details the major program categories of this type of aid. Further information may be found in Appendix D.

Table 3: Social Services and Humanitarian Aid

Program Category	U.S. Agencies	Description
Focused Humanitarian and Social Services: Increased Access to and Quality of Education and Health Services	USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, with partners and subcontractors	Builds education and health capabilities with a focus on demographics susceptible to extremist influence
Focused Humanitarian and Social Services: Immediate Post-Crisis and Humanitarian Assistance	USAID, State, Department, DOD, with partners and subcontractors	Targets victims of natural disasters and conflict along Afghanistan-Pakistan border
Flood Response: Emergency Relief and Early Recovery	USAID, DOD, Narcotics Affairs and Public Affairs sections of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, with partners and subcontractors	Funded broad spectrum of relief programs in wake of 2010 floods

Source: Authors using information from USAID, State, and DOD³²

Key Challenges in Evaluating Aid Effectiveness

Several challenges make the effectiveness of aid provision difficult to evaluate. Although some of these difficulties apply only to security or civilian aid specifically, three challenges need to be addressed for all aid. First, program evaluations often use input-based indicators, but the relationship between development outcomes (such as increased literacy rates) and input indicators (such as government education spending) is weak.³³ Second, although output- or impact-based indicators better reflect development progress, they are contingent on quality data collection, which is not always feasible. Third, Pakistan is one of the more corrupt countries in the world,³⁴ and there are significant difficulties in tracking aid once it has been administered.

Input-based development indicators use the amount of resources devoted to a particular program or initiative; therefore, many of them rely on the recipient country's government budgets and expenditures as evidence of commitment to a given program. Input indicators are often used because data are readily available, but these indicators are problematic because it is difficult to track where the inputs go. Alternatively, output-based indicators measure progress by tracking the quality or quantity of goods and services produced and the efficacy of production.³⁵ Output-based indicators are more prone to data difficulties

(compared with input-based indicators) that can diminish reliability. Difficulties arise from inconsistent indicator definitions over time or changes in indicator measurement tools.³⁶ Furthermore, output data are more difficult to collect, and inconsistent data collection can lead to misguided interpretations of program success or failure.

According to Transparency International, Pakistan ranks 143 out of 178 countries monitored for corruption.³⁷ There are issues with accountability across all categories of aid—once funds are disbursed, it is very difficult to track whether or not it is being used for the intended purpose. Lack of accountability is a concern for the U.S. and Pakistani governments: “In recent years, U.S. [sic] and Pakistanis alike have commented upon the lack of accountability in the disbursement of U.S. funds with both sides blaming the other for lost millions.”³⁸ These concerns make the effective evaluation of aid all the more problematic.

Security-Related Aid

Evaluation of security-related aid programs is challenging for two main reasons: (1) it is hard to define reasonable metrics for gauging progress, and (2) the aforementioned accountability issues.

In most cases, adequate performance indicators are not in place—because security initiatives are preventive in nature, “some proponents note that establishing the outcomes of programs...is impossible, not unlike trying to prove a negative.”³⁹ The U.S. government’s security aid programs are designed to counter perceived ongoing and future threats by supplying the Pakistani military with the training and equipment it needs to combat extremism, which makes it difficult to develop hard metrics by which to measure their progress. Although it is possible to point to anecdotal accounts of American-provided hardware or training being used in counter-terror operations, it is impossible to accurately determine the extent to which hardware or training has curbed the overall extremist threat. The U.S. State Department and USAID published an extensive list of security-related indicators in the FY2009 Foreign Operations Performance Report (which did not pertain to Pakistan specifically), but these are vague, and few are output-based.⁴⁰ The DOD does not publish lists of its performance indicators. Furthermore, these agencies have been unable to implement the evaluation and monitoring tools they do have in any comprehensive manner, according to the Government Accountability Office.⁴¹ Without identification and implementation of performance metrics, it is hard to gauge the impact of these programs on overall U.S. government aims in Pakistan.

The lack of accountability once funds are disbursed is of particular concern in security-related aid. Supporters of security aid programs have noted that this deficiency is in part due to the Pakistani military’s inability to keep up with documentation requirements, but allegations have arisen suggesting that the Pakistanis use the money to bankroll their standoff with India as opposed to focusing it on counterterrorism.⁴² No matter the reason, the fact remains that

U.S. government aid aimed at combating terrorism cannot be tracked once it is delivered to Pakistan.

Civilian Aid

Civilian aid effectiveness is also difficult to evaluate because experts often disagree on the underlying principles that affect development progress—this disagreement calls into question the causal relationship between a program’s outputs and a development outcome. This concern is particularly problematic when attempting to establish a causal link between aid programs and macroeconomic outcomes, such as inflation and unemployment.⁴³ If the causal link between a program output and development outcome is not conclusive, then we cannot be sure that progress on an output indicator actually caused the associated development progress observed. For example, experts disagree regarding how to “best” develop democratic institutions and on the role foreign aid plays in promoting, or hindering the development of these institutions. Without widespread consensus, some experts may use indicators that reflect change according to different definitions of progress that are congruent with their interpretation of development.

How We Assess Aid Effectiveness

In determining the criteria for measuring aid effectiveness, we first break down U.S. government assistance to Pakistan into two broad aid categories: security-related aid and civilian aid. Civilian assistance is further categorized as political and economic assistance or social services aid.

We then determine the primary goals of U.S. government assistance to Pakistan in each aid category. We selected goals according to stated objectives and funding levels in the EPPA, as well as by consulting the literature, from government entities and academia.

We then propose clear, quantifiable indicators that assess the degree to which U.S. government aid has achieved the stated goals. When selecting these indicators, we considered how effectively they would measure progress by asking the following questions:

- How applicable is the indicator to the stated goal?
- How quantifiable is the indicator?
- Are there existing data, or is it feasible that data could be easily collected?
- Is there scholarly evidence to support the effectiveness of the indicator?

In selecting the proposed indicators, we relied on four sources in an order based on how closely they aligned with the EPPA. If we did not find suitable indicators from the first source, we moved on to the next source. We selected indicators from the following sources:

1. *2010 Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan*⁴⁴
USAID, the State Department, and DOD submitted this report to Congress in accordance with the oversight the EPPA dictates. The report outlines civilian aid indicators it is developing to measure the effectiveness of EPPA programs.
2. *Millennium Challenge Corporation Indicators* (See Appendix E)
The Millennium Challenge Corporation indicators evaluate country performance in three categories: Ruling Justly, Investing in People, and Encouraging Economic Freedom. The EPPA includes these indicators as a means of categorizing U.S. government assistance programs in Pakistan.
3. *State Department/USAID's Standard Foreign Assistance Indicators*⁴⁵
The 2009 Foreign Operations Performance Report includes several Standard Foreign Assistance Indicators that the State Department and USAID used to measure performance of foreign assistance in selected countries according to data availability.
4. *Alternate governmental, non-governmental, and academic sources*

The first three sources provided the majority of the indicators for civilian aid. All indicators in the security-related aid category are from the alternate sources. We were unable to use the current standard foreign assistance indicators or Millennium Challenge Corporation indicators in the evaluation of security-related aid. Millennium Challenge Corporation indicators are not relevant to security aid and the State Department's security-related indicators are too vague and input-based to measure outcomes from security assistance in Pakistan.

Measuring Aid Effectiveness

We discuss our key goals and proposed indicators for security-related and civilian aid to Pakistan. Civilian aid is broken into two subcategories, political and economic aid, and social services aid.

Security-Related Aid

The goals and indicators for security-related aid are below. The United States gives funds to Pakistan to counter terrorism and drug-trafficking, to secure its borders, to pay for education and training for military and security personnel, and to safeguard nuclear materials.

Key Goals

Under the umbrella of enhanced security, the U.S. government has three primary goals in Pakistan: disruption of internal extremist activities, a secure Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and improvements in nuclear weapons containment.

The first goal of security assistance is to strengthen the Pakistani security forces' ability to engage extremist groups attacking internal targets, thereby destroying them as a threat. "The [U.S. government] wants to ensure continued use of Pakistani military, police, and intelligence assets to eliminate al Qaeda leadership and cells within the territory of Pakistan."⁴⁶ The best way to achieve this goal is by bolstering counterterrorism capabilities.

The U.S. government also wants its security aid to deny extremists the ability to cross the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border with impunity. The Taliban and al Qaeda have established safe havens all along this 1,500 mile frontier in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province, and they regularly engage in cross-border incursions.⁴⁷ In addition to allowing raids that affect both countries' security, minimal border controls result in unchecked transport of opium from harvests in Afghanistan; the money derived from this crop bankrolls further insurgent activity.⁴⁸ These two concerns form the basis of the U.S. government's second main goal: securing Pakistan's border with Afghanistan.

The U.S. government administers aid to improve nuclear weapons containment. Best estimates place Pakistan's nuclear stockpile at 60 to 90 warheads, and the U.S. government wants to ensure that the central government maintains control of that arsenal.⁴⁹ Given the current extremist threat, the possibility that one or more of these weapons could fall into the wrong hands remains high. Additionally, with war against India an ever-present threat, it is imperative that the Pakistani government itself handles these devices with the utmost care.

Indicators

To measure the outcomes of the U.S. government's assistance goal of disrupting internal extremist activities in Pakistan, we propose two quantitative indicators:

number of violent extremist incidents in Pakistan and size of extremist organizations. These indicators address the actual existence of extremist elements as well as the ability of the extremist groups to launch successful attacks within Pakistan. In its mandated annual report to Congress, the State Department publishes the number of terrorist attacks that occurred in the previous year for each country.⁵⁰ These data are publicly available via the National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incidents Tracking System.⁵¹ This dataset allows the user to sort terrorist incidents by several criteria, including location, type of incident, and the nationality and affiliation of perpetrators and victims. The literature additionally suggests utilizing membership estimates of in-country terrorist organizations to "reflect the broader success of national policies on combating terrorism."⁵² These estimates are found in State Department annual reports, which include a listing of operating terrorist organizations and their estimated membership.⁵³

Measuring outcomes of the goal to increase Afghanistan-Pakistan border security requires indicators relevant to the illegal crossings of both people and drugs. We propose following a RAND Corporation report that suggests using numbers of attempted illegal border crossings by insurgents and narcotics to estimate cross-border flow.⁵⁴ Any attempted crossing prevented by border security would necessarily involve law enforcement action, which should be traceable. Though potentially less reliable, news reports of border arrests are readily available and may serve as a source of attempted Afghanistan-Pakistan border crossings.

These indicators will not be immediately effective, but they can be used as a future measure of progress. If U.S. government aid can be used to strengthen border security then we anticipate improved reliability in tracking progress once that strengthening occurs. Better data coupled with stronger borders will allow for a more accurate estimate of actual unauthorized movements over time.

We propose two indicators to measure the outcomes of U.S. security assistance on Pakistan's nuclear weapons containment: one to measure the internal safety of the nuclear arsenal, another to measure control over external nuclear material trafficking. Criteria for assessing Pakistan's internal commitment to nuclear security and export controls are qualitative by nature, and therefore we propose utilizing the Arms Control Association's 2010 Report Card. This report card assesses a country's adherence to international standards based on a graded scale from A to F as follows:

- A: State is currently adhering to or exceeding the international standard.
- B: State has taken significant steps to adhere to the international standard.
- C: State has taken limited or declaratory steps to adhere to the international standard.
- D: State has taken no action to adhere to the international standard.
- F: State has taken steps inconsistent with or has rejected the international standard.⁵⁵

Using this system, it is possible to qualitatively assess Pakistan’s actions on nuclear security and export controls and transform these actions into a quantitative indicator. Although this indicator does rely on some subjective assessment of terms such as “taken steps” or “action,” we contend that using this scale establishes a means, albeit imperfect, by which progress can be measured over time.

Measuring the effectiveness of assistance toward ensuring Pakistan’s ability to discourage and impede nuclear material trafficking may be achieved by utilizing the Illicit Trafficking Database, a system established by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It records all incidents of radioactive material trafficking.⁵⁶ Monitoring any trafficking incidents in Pakistan allows for a determination of the availability of these materials as well as the efficiency of Pakistan’s radiation detection equipment.

Table 4 provides an overview of our security-related goals and indicators.

Table 4: Security Goals and Indicators

Goals	Indicators
Disrupting internal extremist activities	Number of violent extremist incidents
	Extremist organization membership estimates
Increasing security along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border	Attempted illegal crossings
	Attempted drug flow
Improving nuclear weapons containment	Arms Control Association Report Card scores
	Illicit Trafficking Database incidents

Source: Authors

Civilian Aid

Civilian aid is divided into two subcategories, political and economic aid, and social services aid.

Political and Economic Aid

The goals and indicators for political and economic aid are below. The United States allocates its political and economic aid to Pakistan for improvements to national and local governance and for high-impact, high-visibility infrastructure programs.

Key Political Goals

The U.S. government’s goals for improving Pakistan’s governance system through the EPPA can be grouped into three broad categories: increasing local government capacity, strengthening electoral institutions, and strengthening civil

society.⁵⁷ Engaging citizenry on a local level is of paramount importance in Pakistan, as local buy-in is necessary to avoid abandonment of central governance institutions in favor of the parallel fundamentalist governments that are gaining traction, especially in the western provinces. In addition, the electoral system in Pakistan is broken: local elections have not been held since 2005 (bureaucratic infighting hampered efforts to hold another round of elections), and violence marred the 2007 national elections.⁵⁸ Electoral institutions, properly conceived, provide a mechanism by which politicians can compete for votes and develop reputations for delivering public goods.⁵⁹ They also allow citizens to hold the government accountable for its actions. Finally, civil society organizations can play a role as “honest brokers” in this process, resolving information asymmetries that exist between voters, politicians, and interest groups.⁶⁰ Strengthening electoral institutions, local government capacity, and civil society in general, are fundamental elements of the EPPA’s long-term vision of stabilizing Pakistan.

Indicators

We propose two indicators to measure progress toward the U.S. government’s goal of improving local government capacity: percentage of municipalities making decisions based on joint citizen-local government planning boards, and percentage of citizens who express confidence in local government. An increase in municipalities including citizens in local government planning indicates movement toward government inclusiveness, transparency, and effectiveness. A survey questioning citizens’ confidence in their local government provides an external measure of government performance (the perception of the citizenry). USAID is in the process of developing these indicators; when fully implemented, they will constitute concrete measures of the extent to which local governments include citizens in the policy-making process.⁶¹

Although several nongovernmental organizations monitor elections, we were unable to locate an indicator that measures progress toward strengthening electoral institutions on a yearly, incremental basis. Therefore, we propose using Freedom House’s Political Rights indicator (which is also used to measure Millennium Challenge Corporation’s political goals) as a proxy. This indicator takes into account the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government, and assigns each country a ranking from a high of 1 to a low of 7.⁶²

As a result of the EPPA, USAID already has an indicator to measure progress in civil society development in Pakistan: number of civil society organizations receiving U.S. government-assisted training in advocacy.⁶³ Additionally, we propose that the U.S. government adopt the Civil Society Index that the non-profit organization Civicus employs in much of the world. This index takes into account four dimensions of civil society: its structure, external environment, values, and impact.⁶⁴ Civicus does not operate in Pakistan, but we propose that the State Department and USAID partner with the organization to implement its evaluation in the country. Although the development of civil society is difficult to measure in Pakistan, these two indicators shed some light on the issue.

Table 5 lists the political goals and the indicators we propose to measure progress.

Table 5: Political Goals and Indicators

Goals	Indicators
Improving local governance capacity	Percentage of targeted municipalities that make decisions based on joint citizen-local government planning boards
	Percentage of citizens that express confidence in local government
Strengthening electoral institutions	Political rights
Strengthening civil society	Number of civil society organizations receiving U.S.-assisted training in advocacy
	Civil Society Index

Source: Authors

Key Economic Goals

Pakistan faces serious economic challenges, including high inflation, unemployment⁶⁵ and serious food, water, and energy shortages.⁶⁶ We focus on two areas of Pakistan’s economy that the EPPA specifically targets and that we also identify as critical to Pakistan’s economic development: agriculture and energy.⁶⁷

Increasing the efficiency of the agricultural sector is critical to the country’s overall economic development and is a goal of U.S. aid. Agriculture comprises 21 percent of Pakistan’s gross domestic product and employs 43 percent of its labor force.⁶⁸ More than 90 percent of Pakistan’s limited water supply is earmarked for agricultural use, and approximately one-third of this supply is wasted due to the country’s poor water infrastructure system.⁶⁹ U.S. government assistance modernizes outdated technology and inefficient irrigation methods through high-impact, high-visibility projects.⁷⁰ Improved efficiency in this sector is intended to increase the potable water and food supply and contribute to overall economic development in Pakistan.

Improving energy infrastructure is also a key goal of U.S. government assistance, as reliable and affordable energy availability is one of the major requirements for economic development. Pakistan faces a major energy crisis, and the loss of industrial productivity due to frequent energy shortfalls and blackouts are estimated to cost \$2.5 billion and 400,000 jobs per year.⁷¹ Increasing the availability of reliable and affordable energy is intended to promote economic opportunities by improving overall productivity across the manufacturing, transportation, and agriculture sectors. U.S. government aid targets Pakistan’s energy sector in an effort to rehabilitate the country’s power generation infrastructure and to ameliorate the poor policies, lack of funding, and mismanagement of the sector.⁷²

Indicators

We propose three indicators for measuring progress in the agricultural sector: adjusted agricultural yield, number of farmers adopting new technologies or management practices, and number of additional hectares farmed under those improved technologies or management practices. The Center for Global Development suggests using adjusted agricultural yield to measure the yield per hectare of Pakistan's top five crops: cotton, sugar cane, wheat, maize, and rice.⁷³ This indicator provides an annual assessment of progress in developing agricultural capacity and serves as a proxy for water infrastructure improvements in Pakistan. Data for this indicator are readily available through the Food and Agriculture Organization's database, FAOSTAT.⁷⁴

The other two agricultural indicators are beginning to be tracked by the State Department and USAID in Pakistan as a result of the EPPA.⁷⁵ The number of farmers adopting new technologies or management practices as a result of U.S. government aid reflects the impact of that assistance in helping farmers adopt modern techniques and practices. The number of additional hectares under improved technologies or management practices reflects the impact of U.S. assistance. These indicators provide direct feedback on the outcome of U.S. government-backed programs geared toward modernizing Pakistan's agriculture sector.

The State Department and USAID have several viable indicators in place to measure progress in Pakistan's energy sector. We selected the three that were the most concrete, measurable, and appropriate for measuring the effectiveness of U.S. government energy sector assistance: additional megawatt capacity constructed or rehabilitated, cumulative number of households with electricity, and percent change in load-shedding.⁷⁶ Additional megawatt capacity constructed or rehabilitated is a direct measure of electricity output capacity added in Pakistan as a result of U.S. assistance. It reflects the progress made toward sufficient supply of electricity to ensure development in Pakistan's residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. Cumulative number of households with electricity is a measure of household electricity produced as a result of U.S. assistance and provides data about increased quality of life and productivity due to electricity. Percent change in load shedding (cutting off energy on certain lines when demand exceeds supply) provides a measure of progress toward the goal of supplying enough energy to meet demands. The State Department and USAID have only recently developed these indicators as a result of the EPPA; as with the political indicators, full implementation and data collection are still in progress.

Table 6 outlines economic goals and indicators.

Table 6: Economic Goals and Indicators

Goals	Indicators
Increasing performance in agriculture sector	Adjusted agricultural yield
	Number of farmers adopting new technologies or management practices as a result of U.S. assistance
	Number of additional hectares under improved technologies or management practices as a result of US assistance.
Improving performance in energy sector	Additional megawatt capacity constructed or rehabilitated as a result of U.S. assistance
	Cumulative number of households with electricity as a result of U.S. assistance.
	Percent change in load shedding—cutting off energy on certain lines when demand exceeds supply

Source: Authors

Social Services Aid

The goals and indicators for social services aid are below.

Key Goals

The U.S. government aims to promote sustainable long-term development while placing special emphasis on the need to protect human rights and vulnerable populations through social services and humanitarian aid.⁷⁷ Under the blanket term of long-term development, the U.S. government focuses on two primary goals: raising the standard of education and improving public health.

The U.S. government stresses a need for strong educational institutions to counteract extremist influence in Pakistan.⁷⁸ To discourage at-risk Pakistani youth from aligning with extremist organizations, the U.S. provides assistance to help achieve universal access to public, modernized education. The U.S. aims to improve modern primary and secondary education, along with vocational and technical training, and higher education, in part by funding the construction and maintenance of libraries and public schools. It also seeks to ensure Pakistan develops modern, nationwide curricula and proper oversight for all public, private, and religious schools to “improve the prospects for Pakistani children’s futures and eliminate incitements to violence and intolerance.” Additionally, the U.S. government strives to improve educational opportunities for Pakistani women and girls by funding initiatives that enhance access to education and vocational training for women and girls, increase women’s literacy, and increase the number of girls staying in school.⁷⁹

Though the U.S. government advocates certain public health policies throughout the world, the U.S. government has several specific priorities in Pakistan. For

example, the U.S. government includes Pakistan as a maternal and child health priority country for development funding.⁸⁰ One specific goal is to improve public health by reducing and eliminating disease. The U.S. government also aims to use social services aid to reduce maternal mortality and mortality for children under age five, provide safe drinking water, and help meet family planning needs.⁸¹

Indicators

To measure progress in raising education standards, we propose two indicators: primary education net enrollment rate and girls' primary education completion rate. The primary education net enrollment rate is the best available measure of progress toward the U.S. government goals of achieving universal primary education in Pakistan and reaching at-risk youth. This indicator is considered problematic because student enrollment does not necessarily mean students are attending school. However, adapting this indicator to count the number of students enrolled in U.S. government-supported programs offers an important insight into where U.S. aid is reaching new students. This indicator helps gauge whether U.S. government education assistance is reaching youth in areas considered to be the most at-risk for extremist influence. The State Department and USAID collect data for this indicator.⁸²

The girls' primary education completion rate indicator serves as a measure of progress in several key areas: universal access to public, modernized education, increased educational opportunities for women and girls, and increased female literacy. Furthermore, we recommend using the girls' primary education completion rate indicator because scholarly research indicates that girls' primary education is strongly correlated with a positive effect on health, future schooling, and productivity. Increased years of schooling are also associated with improvements in other related U.S. assistance goals, including higher immunization rates and decreased child and maternal mortality.⁸³ Although gender-specific data pertinent to this goal are not available for Pakistan, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) provides gender-specific enrollment rates as well as overall primary school completion rates;⁸⁴ therefore, data-collection methods are in place and this indicator should be relatively simple to determine.

We propose four indicators to measure progress in public health: immunization rate, under-five mortality rate, number of people with access to improved drinking water, and contraceptive prevalence rate. The immunization rate indicator reflects progress toward the U.S. government's goal of reducing and eliminating major infectious diseases and is recognized by the international aid community as a solid proxy of a country's investment in public health.⁸⁵ To reduce and eliminate major infectious diseases, it is beneficial to increase immunization rates. High immunization rates, as well as the resulting high investment in public health, are associated with decreased infections. The Center for Global Development recommends that the immunization rates indicator be based on only the diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT3) vaccine.⁸⁶ USAID presently collects DPT3 immunization rate data for this indicator.⁸⁷

The under-five mortality indicator “is the leading indicator of child health and overall development in developing countries.”⁸⁸ Since nearly three-quarters of deaths in this age range are preventable, the under-five mortality indicator is a particularly robust measure of progress. Many health policies and development efforts factor into performance on this indicator, making it an appropriate choice for measuring U.S. social services aid effectiveness. This indicator, however, is prone to lag-time concerns (i.e., results may take some time to become apparent), which should be noted in future evaluations of U.S. government aid effectiveness.⁸⁹ The World Health Organization collects data on this indicator.⁹⁰

The number of people with access to improved drinking water indicator represents progress in reducing and eliminating major infectious diseases (i.e., cholera and typhoid), reducing child mortality, and providing clean drinking water. According to the Center for Global Development, improvements according to this indicator demonstrate high aid effectiveness because lack of access to safe drinking water is not only a public health concern but is felt in terms of lost productivity. This indicator is a strong representation of increased investment in public health because “improved access to water must be accompanied by sanitation and hygiene efforts.”⁹¹ The State Department and USAID track progress on this indicator.⁹²

We also recommend including the contraceptive prevalence rate indicator because it is a strong indicator of improvements in women’s and infant health. The contraceptive prevalence rate is defined as “the percentage of women between 15–49 years who are practicing, or whose sexual partners are practicing, any form of contraception.”⁹³ The contraceptive prevalence rate is an indicator of “a range of appropriate policies that contribute to better pre-conceptional planning, pregnancy and infant health”⁹⁴ and, as such, the State Department and USAID are monitoring the rate.⁹⁵

Table 7 provides information about social services goals and indicators.

Table 7: Social Services Goals and Indicators

Goals	Indicators
Improving education	Girls’ primary education completion rate
	Primary education net enrollment rate
Improving health	Immunization rate
	Access to improved drinking water
	Child mortality
	Contraceptive prevalence rate

Source: Authors

Conclusion

The EPPA marked a significant shift in U.S. strategy toward Pakistan. To eliminate the extremist threat and promote long-term stability, the U.S. government recognized the need to focus not only on security measures, but on social, political, and economic development as well. For this approach to succeed, however, there must be a way to measure progress. The 23 indicators that we propose in this report provide a basis for measuring the extent to which U.S. aid to Pakistan is effective in making that progress. Although there are challenges inherent in this type of performance measurement (and consequently, there are weaknesses in these indicators), these indicators nevertheless represent a strong foundation going forward. The U.S. government has a remarkable opportunity to contribute long-term stability to a country that has longed lacked it; it must ensure that its aid does not go to waste.

Appendix A: Development as a Tool to Prevent Terrorism

The idea of a link between national security and development is not new; in fact, many Cold War agendas incorporated the idea that poverty reduction and development are considered essential components of success.⁹⁶ Recently, a renewed call to fund security-related development initiatives generated considerable attention. The idea that preventing extremism is inextricably linked with increased overall development in Pakistan has recently been fully embraced by the current administration. In her remarks during the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Discussion, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton argued: “We know that security cannot be divorced from development... we know that long-term stability requires improved government capacity at every level. It requires a common and concerted effort against corruption, implementing the vision and proposals that the President laid out in his inaugural address and at the London conference.”⁹⁷ In his FY2012 budget proposal, President Obama reasserted this position.⁹⁸

The U.S. government is not without support in this area. While that support may have developed partly out of the reality that exclusively military efforts have been unsuccessful in eliminating (or sufficiently limiting) extremist activities, evidence suggests that improving development contributes to a reduction of extremist activities in some contexts. The Canadian International Development Agency, for example, argues that: “Security and development are inextricably linked.” Jo Beall, an expert in terrorism and development at the London School of Economics, stresses that the vulnerability caused by terrorism not only disrupts current conditions, but also hinders future development because countries are forced to continuously refocus development spending on reconstruction efforts. Beyond economic damages, Beall argues, “When you have a situation of high risk and high insecurity you have an increase in gated communities, the[y are] better off closing down... disengaging from development cooperation, disengaging from working with governments, disengaging from paying their municipal taxes and so you have a breakdown in governance and democracy, and that is one of the biggest casualties of terrorism for development.”⁹⁹

According to Eli Berman, a leading expert in international security studies: “There is an avenue through which the quality of governance and economic development matter. It turns out that the lethality of terrorist organizations is well predicted by the ability of their parent organizations to provide benign social services to their constituencies.”¹⁰⁰ This suggests that a government could, theoretically, undermine a terrorist organization (or at least limit its lethality) through the provision of social services to “at risk” constituents. Another study, based on reconstruction spending and violence data in Iraq, shows that “the provision of certain government services does lead to a reduction in violence.”¹⁰¹

The argument that development will reduce extremist activity is not universally accepted¹⁰² in part because empirical research has been limited. It is difficult to

establish “neat” causal relationships in this area of study, but there is clearly room for additional study. There are at least three factors that need to be rigorously examined before one can accept a causal relationship between development and reduced extremism:

1. Whether funding increases for development programs designed to combat extremism are actually being allocated to these programs, not lost in implementation through corruption and inefficiency;
2. Whether development programs proven effective in reducing extremism on the small scale can be effectively scaled-up; and
3. Whether alternative efforts by extremist groups (e.g., new recruitment techniques, new terrorist cells) emerge to counteract development efforts.

Appendix B: U.S. Government Security Assistance to Pakistan

The U.S. government supplies security-related assistance to Pakistan through the following programs:

Coalition Support Funds

The largest source of security-related monetary transfers to Pakistan was in the form of Coalition Support Funds, which account for \$8.1 billion of the total assistance to the Pakistani government. The Pakistani government submits what it considers to be expenses incurred while fighting extremist groups, and the DOD has the power to approve the expenses and reimburse the government. As Coalition Support Funds is a reimbursement program, it is not technically designated as foreign assistance, and thus it is not included in our aid calculations.¹⁰³

Section 1206 Program

The Section 1206 program was established in 2006 under the National Defense Authorization Act as a source of funding for training and equipping foreign militaries in support of counterterrorism or stability operations in which the U.S. military is participating.¹⁰⁴ The secretary of defense is authorized to allocate up to \$350 million per year in Section 1206 funds with the approval of the secretary of state, and thus far the funds have been used primarily to support counterterrorism operations in 53 countries.¹⁰⁵ Pakistan has received \$212 million since the program's inception, making it the second largest recipient country of Section 1206 assistance.¹⁰⁶ Under the 2008 version of the act, Section 1206 authorized the DOD to provide additional monies to the Pakistan Frontier Corps for conducting counterterrorism operations along the Afghan border. The U.S. government has provided an additional \$100 million in assistance for this operation.

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

Since 2002, Pakistan has received \$528 million from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement fund. Opiate and hashish trafficking is linked to the financing of insurgents along the Afghan border; therefore, one of the primary objectives of funding is the fortification of this border.¹⁰⁷ This program is administered under the State Department and provides assistance not only for border security, but also law enforcement and counternarcotics.

Counternarcotics Fund

The U.S. government has given \$220 million to Pakistan under the Counternarcotics Fund. This fund falls under the auspices of DOD, but approximately half of the allocated monies were transferred to the control of the State Department.¹⁰⁸

Foreign Military Financing

Foreign military financing is the largest source of U.S. government security assistance to Pakistan. Since 2002, the U.S. government has provided \$2.2 billion

in grants to the government to allow the purchase of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training, through the foreign military sales program.¹⁰⁹ DOD and the State Department administer the foreign military financing grants are administered by DOD and the State Department.

International Military Education and Training

The U.S. government has provided \$18.4 million in International Military Education and Training funds since 2002.¹¹⁰ The program pays for professional education and military management and technical training on U.S. weapons systems. The funds fall under the State Department's budget, but DOD conducts the training.¹¹¹

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related

The U.S. government has provided \$87.25 million to Pakistan under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related program administered by the State Department.¹¹² Enhancing Pakistan's export control regulations and enforcement is intended to ensure that sensitive nuclear materials do not fall into the hands of extremist groups.¹¹³ Additionally, antiterrorism assistance is provided in the form of counterterrorism training and equipment.¹¹⁴

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund

The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund was established in 2009 under the auspices of DOD and has provided approximately \$1.1 billion.¹¹⁵ Administration of the fund was transferred to the State Department at the outset of FY2011. The fund is intended to train and equip Pakistan's army and related security forces, with particular emphasis placed on combat in Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas.¹¹⁶ Training is also provided for relief in post-combat operations.¹¹⁷

Appendix C: U.S. Government Political and Economic Assistance to Pakistan

The EPPA focuses on two main categories of political and economic aid: government capacity development and high-impact, high-visibility infrastructure development. The government capacity development category is further broken down into two types of programs: improved national and local governance, and improved security and legal institutions. Because we discuss security-related aid separately, we do not include the improved security and legal institutions programs in this report.

Improved National and Local Governance

Improved national and local governance assistance during FY2009 and FY2010 totaled \$257.8 million.¹¹⁸ USAID manages the majority of the assistance in this area, with a small fraction of funds managed by the Political Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy. Table C.1 lists current programs in this area.

Table C.1: Government Capacity Development Programs

Program Description	Implementing Partner
Antifraud hotline	Transparency International
Support and public awareness program	Transparency International
Three nationwide polls	International Republican Institute
Election support	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Gender equity	Aurat Foundation
Small grants for unsolicited proposals and chief of mission fund	National Rural Support Program
E-governance, national data center	U.S. State Department
Federally Administered Tribal Areas capacity-building	Development Alternatives Inc.
Bajaur urban centers (urban planning and systems for municipal government)	Federally Administered Tribal Areas Secretariat
Pakistan energy indefinite quantity contract: provide policy reform advisors to support the energy partnership between USAID and government of Pakistan	Advanced Engineering Associates International and Government of Pakistan

Source: USAID, Department of State, DOD: Quarterly Progress Report¹¹⁹

High Impact, High-Visibility Infrastructure

In FY2009 and FY2010, U.S. assistance to the energy and agriculture sectors totaled \$459.4 million. The assistance programs focus primarily on developing energy sources such as hydroelectricity and improving agricultural methods such as irrigation. Table C.2 lists the programs in this category.

Table C.2: High-Impact, High-Visibility Infrastructure Programs

Program Description	Implementing Partner
Satpara Dam, hydropower and irrigation	Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)
Gomal Zam Dam, hydropower and transmission line completion	WAPDA
Gomal Zam irrigation (agriculture)	WAPDA
Tarbela hydroelectric power station rehabilitation	WAPDA
Jamshorro thermal power station repair and maintenance	Ministry of Water and Power, Power Generation Company (GENCO I)
Muzaffargarh thermal power station repair and maintenance	GENCO II
Guddu thermal power station repair and maintenance	GENCO III
Wind-power generation in Sindh	WAPDA
Irrigation tube well efficiency improvement	International Resources Group
Balochistan surface water management (agriculture)	Provincial government of Balochistan
High-efficiency irrigation systems	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
Water supply and sanitation in Jacobabad	Provincial government of Sindh
Water supply and sanitation in Peshawar	Provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Lady Willingdon Hospital	Ministry of Health and provincial government of Punjab
Jacobabad Civil Hospital	Ministry of Health and provincial government of Sindh
Jinnah postgraduate medical center OB-GYN/fistula ward	Ministry of Health and provincial government of Sindh
Karachi warehouse to store immunization and other medical supplies	Winrock International
Construction of parliamentary institute	Habib-Rafique (Pvt.) Ltd./ Clean Development Mécanisme

Program Description	Implementing Partner
Municipal services delivery	Provincial governments of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan
Pakistan transition initiative in Federally Administered Tribal Areas	IOM, Creative Associates, Internews
South Waziristan quick impact (road, water, and electricity)	Government of Pakistan / Federally Administered Tribal Areas Secretariat / Frontier Works Organization
Malakand quick impact (schools, health, water and sanitation, government capacity)	Provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa / Provincial Reconstruction Rehabilitation, and Settlement Authority
Commercial law development: advisors to support gem and mineral markets	U.S. Department of Commerce

Source: USAID, U.S. State Department, DOD: Quarterly Progress Report¹²⁰

Appendix D: U.S. Government Social Services and Humanitarian Aid to Pakistan

The EPPA includes a broad category of social services aid, entitled Focused Humanitarian and Social Services Aid, that is divided into two sub-categories: Increased Access to and Quality of Education and Health Services, and Immediate Post-Crisis and Humanitarian Assistance. Following the August and September 2010 floods in Pakistan, the U.S. government created an additional funding category, entitled Flood Response: Emergency Relief and Early Recovery.

Focused Humanitarian and Social Services

Focused humanitarian and social services aid during FY2009 and FY2010 totaled \$1.5 billion.¹²¹ USAID manages funding for the majority of focused humanitarian and social services programs, with additional programs managed through the United Nations, DOD, U.S. State Department, U.S. Department of Labor, and the U.S. embassy's political affairs section.¹²² To monitor assistance, focused humanitarian and social services funding is divided into two sub-categories: immediate post-crisis and humanitarian assistance, and increased access to and quality of education and health services.

Focused Humanitarian and Social Services: Increased Access to and Quality of Education and Health Services

Funding in this category seeks to “provide quality education and health services to underserved populations, particularly those living in areas likely to come under the sway of extremist groups.”¹²³ Our analysis of social services aid effectiveness focuses exclusively on this category because 21 USAID programs focus on improving education, maternal and child health, family planning, and polio eradication. See Table D.1 for a list of current USAID programs. The U.S. Department of Agriculture provided grants of \$17 million to the company Land O'Lakes and the UN World Food Programme to feed schoolchildren, implement rehabilitations projects, and capacity building for schools. The public affairs section of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan's programs provide \$36.7 million to programs designed to increase access to and quality of education services; specifically, public affairs programs are designed to provide “enhanced educational and professional skills, leadership training, and connections with the United States.”¹²⁴ USAID is the primary contributor to U.S. government assistance in this area, with support from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the public affairs section.¹²⁵

Table D.1: USAID Programs Designed to Increase Access to and Quality of Education and Health Services

Program Description	Implementing Partner
Pakistan initiative for mothers and newborns	JSI Research and Training Institute
Pakistan safe drinking water and hygiene	Abt Associates
Pre-service teacher education	Academy for Educational Development
Links to Learning—Education Support to Pakistan	American Institutes for Research
Children’s television – interactive teaching and learning	Rafi Peer Theatre Workshop
Pakistan and U.S. science and technology cooperation	National Academy of Sciences
Higher education commission – financial aid development	Academy for Educational Development
Collaborative capacity building for human rights and gender	American University Washington College of Law
Budget support to higher education commission	Government of Pakistan
Fulbright scholarships (through U.S. Department of State)	Government of Pakistan
Higher education commission – merit- and needs-based scholarships	Government of Pakistan
Diversification of family planning activities	Population Council
Contraceptive commodities for the ministries of health and population welfare	Contraceptive Commodities Procurement
Contraceptive logistic support	John Snow Inc.
Polio eradication initiative	UNICEF, World Health Organization
Tuberculosis control assistance and national prevalence survey	Royal Netherlands Tuberculosis Association (Koninklijk Nederlandsche Centrale Vereeniging)
Involvement of religious leaders in health and development, extending service delivery	Pathfinder International
Pakistan field epidemiology and laboratory training program	U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Developed and strengthened institutional capacity in public training and research	Health Services Academy of Pakistan
Improved children’s health in Federally Administered Tribal Areas	Save the Children

Program Description	Implementing Partner
Disease surveillance	Government of Pakistan
Maternal and child health, family planning, and immunizations	Government of Pakistan
Health – higher education and training	To be determined
Southern Punjab basic education	Provincial government of Punjab
International School of Islamabad	International School of Islamabad
Universities and teaching hospitals	Government of Pakistan ministries, local organizations

Source: USAID, DOS, DOD: *Quarterly Progress Report*¹²⁶

Focused Humanitarian and Social Services: Immediate Post-Crisis and Humanitarian Assistance

Aid provided in the immediate post-crisis and humanitarian services sub-category is administered under different circumstances compared with long-term development aid and is not examined in this paper.

Flood Response: Emergency Relief and Early Recovery

In addition to the focused humanitarian and social services aid program category, large-scale flooding in Pakistan led to the creation of an additional relevant aid category: flood response: emergency relief and early recovery. During FY2009 and FY2010, these two aid categories were allocated more than \$2.1 billion in U.S. funding.

Because we chose to focus on long-term aid effectiveness and emergency humanitarian aid operates under drastically different circumstances compared with standard aid, we do not examine flood response aid effectiveness.

Appendix E: Millennium Challenge Corporation Indicators and Data Sources¹²⁷

Ruling Justly

- Civil Liberties (Freedom House)
- Political Rights (Freedom House)
- Control of Corruption (World Bank/Brookings Institution World Governance Indicators)
- Government Effectiveness (World Bank/Brookings Institution World Governance Indicators)
- Rule of Law (World Bank/Brookings Institution World Governance Indicators)
- Voice and Accountability (World Bank/Brookings Institution World Governance Indicators)

Investing in People

- Immunization Rates (World Health Organization and UNICEF)
- Public Expenditure on Health (World Health Organization)
- Girls' Primary Education Completion Rate (UNESCO)
- Public Expenditure on Primary Education (UNESCO and national sources)
- Natural Resource Management (Center for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University and Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy)

Encouraging Economic Freedom

- Business Start-Up (International Finance Corporation)
- Land Rights and Access (International Fund for Agricultural Development and International Finance Corporation)
- Trade policy (Heritage Foundation)
- Regulatory Quality (World Bank/Brookings Institution World Governance Indicators)
- Inflation (International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook)
- Fiscal Policy (International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook)

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